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Abstract
We evaluate the case for inflation stabilization in a New Keynesian (NNS) model
that includes various frictions, capital accumulation and a variety of shocks. In such
a model, price rigidity may provide the monetary authorities with an opportunity
to improve upon the inefficient flexible price equilibrium via the suitable cyclical
manipulation of real marginal costs. We find that such an opportunity is of limited
value and that a strong case for perfect inflation stabilization remains. Policies that
tolerate a small amount of inflation variability may outperform perfect inflation
targeting when capital adjustment costs are low and the monetary distortion is
substantial but only if prices are very flexible.
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Introduction
The recent literature on optimal monetary policy has studied extensively the
welfare properties of price (or inflation) targeting within the New Neoclassical
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Synthesis, NNS (or, new Keynesian, NK) model. This literature has estab-
lished that in the absence of capital accumulation and money demand fric-
tions, a policy of price stability is approximately optimal (Clarida, Gal´ı and
Gertler (1999), Goodfriend and King (1997), Woodford (2003)).
Money demand frictions have well known implications for the properties of
optimal monetary policy. In addition to the standard Friedman zero nominal
interest rate rule, their presence also induces a bias in favor of interest rate sta-
bilization. Combined with rigid prices, they create a genuine tension between
eliminating the relative price and the money demand distortion. Nonetheless,
Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Woodford (2003) show that, under some
restrictions on preferences, production and the type of shocks, this tension
is resolved overwhelmingly in favor of addressing the first distortion so that
optimal deviations from price stability are likely to be small.
The implications of the presence of capital accumulation for the properties
of optimal policy have received less attention and have also proved harder
to assess. Observing that the markup acts as a tax on inputs and relying on
optimal taxation principles, Goodfriend and King (2001) speculate that price
stability would remain optimal in the NNS model even when capital were
included. 2 Nonetheless, this conjecture has not yet been formally addressed.
Our objective is to examine the case for perfect inflation stabilization in a
more realistic model that includes capital accumulation, shocks to technology,
government expenditures and the demand for money and where the flexible
price equilibrium is inefficient due to an imperfect competition distortion and
a monetary friction. Most of the literature deals with price targeting and does
not distinguish too carefully between that and inflation targeting. We have
opted for studying the latter as it seems more relevant for economies which,
like their real world counterparts, exhibit sustained nominal growth. Moreover,
abstracting from the money demand friction, our formulation allows for long
term money neutrality, a desirable feature in the analysis of monetary policy.
2 Note, though, that there exists an important difference between the standard tax
smoothing argument and that of markup constancy. In the former, both the average
tax rate and its variation are optimally selected. In the latter, the steady state tax
rate (markup) is exogenous and only its cyclical variation is selected.
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We solve the model using a second order approximation to the policy functions
in order to compute accurate welfare measures (see Woodford (2003)). We do
not attempt to characterize the globally optimal policy (a computationally
demanding strategy) but instead restrict ourselves to a simpler but quite valu-
able task. Namely, to the investigation of whether commonly studied policies
that entail substantial price variability, such as a Henderson–McKibbin–Taylor
(see Henderson and McKibbin (1993)) rule with imperfect inflation targeting
or money or interest rate targeting, outperform perfect inflation stabilization.
Admittedly, such an approach has the weakness that the rules considered may
not be close to the globally optimal rule. And that the parameters of the rule
are taken for granted rather than chosen to optimize outcomes within these
rules. Nonetheless, it still seems interesting to study this issue as we think that
it is important to evaluate whether simple rules that have been the subject
of much recent discussion among academics and central bank economists can
produce welfare that is not too different from the heralded constant inflation
(or perfect price stability) rule.
We search across a large set of model specifications, involving variation in
several key features (the degree of risk aversion, capital adjustment costs, the
degree of nominal rigidity, the size of the average mark up, and the size of
money demand frictions). Our results can be summarized as follows. In the
vast majority of cases, perfect inflation targeting dominates the simple rules
considered.
In a few cases, perfect inflation targeting is outperformed by some of these
rules. But this occurs only when prices are very flexible which implies a minor
role for monetary policy.
Consequently, while the presence of capital accumulation and a monetary
friction may undermine qualitatively the case for perfect inflation stability, this
occurs in situations of little practical interest and is of negligible quantitative
importance.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the
model economy. Section 2 discusses parameter selection. The main findings
are presented in section 3.
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1 The model
The setup is the standard NNS model. The economy is populated by a large
number of identical infinitely–lived households and consists of two sectors: one
producing intermediate goods and the other a final good. The intermediate
good is produced with capital and labor and the final good with intermedi-
ate goods. The final good is homogeneous and can be used for consumption
(private and public) and investment purposes.
1.1 The Household
Household preferences are characterized by the lifetime utility function: 3
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsU (Ct+s, 1− ht+s) (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor, Ct and ht respectively denote
consumption and hours worked.
In each and every period, the household faces the budget constraint
Bt +Mt + Pt(Ct + It + Tt) + Ptτ(vt; ζt)Ct≤PtWtht + PtztKt +Πt + . . .
+Rt−1Bt−1 +Mt−1 +Nt (2)
where Bt andMt are nominal bonds and money acquired during period t, Pt is
the nominal price of the final good, Rt is the nominal interest rate, Wt and zt
are the real wage rate and real rental rate of capital. The household owns Kt
units of physical capital, makes an additional investment of It, consumes Ct
and supplies ht units of labor. It pays lump sum taxes Tt, receives a transfer
of money Nt from the government and finally claims the profits, Πt, earned
by the firms. τ(vt; ζt) denotes a proportional transaction cost that depends
on the household’s money–to–nominal consumption ratio, vt = PtCt/Mt. The
3 Et(.) denotes mathematical conditional expectations. Expectations are condi-
tional on information available at the beginning of period t.
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function τ(·, ·) is borrowed from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a).
τ(vt; ζt) = ζt
(
Avt +
B
vt
− 2
√
AB
)
ζt is a money demand shock whose properties will be defined later. Letting ζ
tend toward zero, 4 we get close to a “cashless” economy.
Capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs and follows the process
Kt+1 = It − ϕ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt + (1− δ)Kt (3)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the rate of depreciation and ϕ > 0 is the capital
adjustment cost parameter.
The household determines consumption/savings, money holdings and leisure
plans by maximizing utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and capital
accumulation equation (3).
1.2 Final Sector
The representative firm in the final sector produces a homogenous good that
may be used for consumption — private or public — and investment purposes.
The final good is produced by combining intermediate goods according to a
technology described by the following CES function
Yt =
 1∫
0
Xt(i)
θdi

1
θ
(4)
where θ ∈ (−∞, 1). θ determines the elasticity of substitution between the
various intermediate goods. The producers in this sector are assumed to behave
competitively. Profit maximization yields the following demand functions for
good i
Xt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
Yt (5)
4 In the practical implementation of the model we set ζ =1e-12
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where the general price index is given by Pt =
 1∫
0
Pt(i)
θ
θ−1di

θ−1
θ
.
1.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each firm i, i ∈ (0, 1), produces an intermediate good by means of capital and
labor according to a constant returns–to–scale technology, represented by the
production function
Xt(i) = AtKt(i)
αht(i)
1−α with α ∈ (0, 1) (6)
where Kt(i) and ht(i) respectively denote the physical capital and the labor
input used by firm i in the production process. At is an exogenous stationary
stochastic technology shock, whose properties will be defined later. The firms
operate under perfect competition in the input markets but are monopolisti-
cally competitive in the product markets. They are assumed to set prices for
the good they produce according to the Calvo scheme. In order to maintain
long term money neutrality (in the absence of monetary frictions) we also as-
sume that the price set by the non–optimizing firms grows at the steady state
rate of inflation, pi. This leads to the price setting equation
p˜t(i) =
1
θ
Et
∞∑
s=0
(1− γ)spi sθ−1Φt+sP
2−θ
1−θ
t+s Cm,t+sYt+s
Et
∞∑
s=0
(1− γ)spi θθ−1 sΦt+sP
1
θ−1
t+s Yt+s
(7)
where γ is the probability that firm i resets its price in period t. Φt is an
appropriate discount factor related to the way the household values future
as opposed to current consumption and Cm,t is the marginal cost. Then, the
aggregate intermediate price index is given by
Pt =
 ∞∑
s=0
γ(1− γ)s
(
p˜t−s
pis
) θ
θ−1

θ−1
θ
(8)
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1.4 The Monetary Authorities
As mentioned before, our objective is not to characterize the globally opti-
mal policy. But rather to examine whether some simple monetary rules that
have been the subject of much debate among academics and central bank
economists produce welfare that is very different (and potentially higher) from
the constant inflation rule. These popular policy rules may allow for “large”
deviations from perfect inflation stability. We study four such rules.
(i) Targeting of the growth rate of the money supply:
µt = µ (9)
The nominal interest rate then adjusts to clear the money market.
(ii) Targeting of the nominal interest rate. 5
Rt = R (10)
In this case, the money supply adjusts in order to clear the money market.
(iii) Perfect inflation targeting. In this case, we consider a rule a` la Henderson–
McKibbin–Taylor that takes the form
R̂t = κpip̂it (11)
Perfect inflation targeting obtains when κpi =∞. 6 In this case, as under
interest rate targeting, money supply adjusts to clear the money market.
(iv) Imperfect inflation targeting. Under this rule we use a “small” value of κpi
in rule (11). In most of the simulations run involving imperfect inflation
targeting we used κpi = 1.5.
5 In order to avoid the well known indeterminacy problems, we have specified this
rule as follows in the practical implementation
R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + (1− ρ)kpipit with ρ = 0.999 and kpi = 1.001
where pit is the rate of inflation and aˆstands for log–deviations from the determin-
istic steady state.
6 In our experiments, perfect inflation targeting will be approximated by setting
κpi = 10000. Using greater values for κpi does not affect our results.
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1.5 The Government
The government finances government expenditures on the domestic final good
using lump sum taxes. The stationary component of government expenditures
is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process, whose properties are
defined below in section 2.
2 Parametrization of the Model
The model is parameterized on US quarterly data for the period 1960:1–2000:4.
The data are taken from the Federal Reserve Database. 7 The baseline param-
eters are reported in table 1.
— Table 1 about here —
The nominal growth of the economy is set equal to the sample average of
the rate of growth of M1 over the period, implying µ = 2.6% per quarter.
The quarterly depreciation rate, δ, is 0.025 implying an annual depreciation
of about 10%. The value of the capital adjustment cost parameter, ϕ, is set to
10 in our benchmark experiment. We vary it in our sensitivity analysis from
0 to ∞. In the benchmark case, θ is equal to 0.80 so that the markup rate is
25% in the steady state. α, the elasticity of the production function to physical
capital, is set such that the model reproduces the US labor share — defined
as the ratio of labor compensation to GDP — over the sample period (0.575).
at = log(At/A) is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process of the form
at = ρaat−1 + εa,t
with |ρa| < 1 and εa,t ; N (0, σ2a). We set σa = 0.0079 and ρa = 0.95.
7 URL:http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/
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The government spending shock 8 is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
log(gt) = ρg log(gt−1) + (1− ρg) log(g) + εg,t
with |ρg| < 1 and εg,t ∼ N (0, σ2g). Estimating this process over the sample
period leads to a persistence parameter, ρg, of 0.9696 and a standard deviation
of innovations of σg = 0.0098. The government spending to output ratio is set
to its observed sample average, 0.22.
The instantaneous utility function takes the form
U (Ct, `t) =
1
1− σ
[(
Cνt (1− ht)1−ν
)1−σ − 1]
σ, the coefficient ruling risk aversion, is set equal to 1.5 in the benchmark
case. ν is set such that the model generates a total fraction of time devoted
to market activities of 31%. β, the discount factor is set such that households
discount the future at a 5% annual rate.
The two parameters, A and B, defining the properties of the transaction cost
function, are borrowed from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a). This led us to
set A=0.0111 and B=0.0752. The money demand shock also follows an AR(1)
process
log(ζt) = ρζ log(ζt−1) + (1− ρζ) log(ζ) + εζ,t
with |ρζ | < 1 and εζ,t ∼ N (0, σ2ζ ). We use parameter values estimated by
Ireland (2004), namely, ρζ = 0.95 and σζ = 0.018. In the cashless economy the
average value of ζ is set to 1e-12. 9 . In the non–cashless economy, ζ is set to
1.
γ, the probability of price resetting is set in the benchmark case at 0.25,
implying that the average length of price contracts is 4 quarters.
8 The logarithm of the government expenditures are first detrended using a linear
trend.
9 Considering smaller values of ζ does not affect the results.
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In the simulations, we vary capital adjustment costs, ϕ, relative risk aversion
σ, the markup θ, the degree of monetary friction, ζ, and the probability of
price resetting, γ.
3 The Results
The model is solved using a second order perturbation method (see Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b)). An attractive feature of this approach is that it
breaks the certainty equivalence property that characterizes the standard log–
linear approximation. This allows the volatility terms — which do matter for
welfare — to enter the decision rules. 10 . The method is therefore more likely
to deliver accurate welfare results. The level of welfare is computed taking
a high order approximation to the utility function. 11 We simulate series for
consumption, {ct}Tt=0, and leisure, {`t}Tt=0, and compute high order moments
from the series. These moments are then entered into the approximation of
the utility function in order to compute expected welfare. Each series has a
length T=5000 12 Each experiment is repeated 1000 times and the results are
averaged.
In order to produce more meaningful welfare evaluations we have converted
expected utility levels into ”wealth” equivalent levels 13 according to the fol-
lowing procedure. Let u? be the level of –maximized– expected, lifetime utility
computed under a particular model specification and monetary policy (for in-
stance, in a cashless economy under money supply targeting). Consider the
maximization problem: maxu(c, l)/(1 − β) subject to λ = c + wl where w is
the steady state wage rate and λ will be defined shortly. The solution to this
problem is c = c(λ) and l = l(λ). Plugging the optimal values of c and l into
10Our solution method takes into account the fact that, unlike the case of a log–
linear approximation, there is a non–trivial aggregation problem. Namely, that the
“Solow residual” type of term that aggregation introduces into the production func-
tion is no longer a constant (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)).
11We report results with a 8th order approximation. The results do not differ when
we considered terms of higher order.
12 Simulating longer series does not affect our welfare ranking.
13We are grateful to Bob King for suggesting this measure.
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the utility function gives u = u(c(λ), l(λ)) = u(λ). Let λ now be determined
by equating u(λ) to u?. Hence, λ is the amount of wealth (permanent income)
that is needed under this particular monetary policy in order to support a
stationary level of utility equal to u?. We then define the wealth loss (gain),
L, from pursuing a policy F rather than a policy of perfect inflation P as LF
= 100×(λ(P )− λ(F ))/λ(P ).
We are interested in the role played by several important features of the model,
namely, the presence of investment, the monetary friction, the degree of risk
aversion, the level of capital adjustment costs, the level of average mark ups
and the degree of price rigidity (the frequency of price resetting). Capital accu-
mulation is important because, as Goodfriend and King (2001), have argued,
the volatility of investment increases the monetary authority’s incentive to
stabilize employment–consumption by manipulating cyclical markups, which
tends to strengthen the case for inflation stability. But at the same time, in-
vestment represents an additional channel for intertemporal smoothing for the
households that makes it more difficult for the central bank to produce transi-
tory variations in consumption via markup manipulation. Hence, the net effect
of the inclusion of capital accumulation cannot be determined on theoretical
grounds only.
The monetary friction matters because, in addition to the standard Friedman
case for deflation, it makes variation in the nominal interest rate costly. The
steady state level of the markup matters because in the absence of a fiscal sub-
sidy, it determines the degree of inefficiency of the equilibrium in the flexible
price version of our model and consequently the incentives of the monetary
authorities to improve upon it. The degree of price rigidity is important for
two reasons. First, it matters for the size of the relative price distortion and
hence for the trade off between the various distortions. And second, it deter-
mines how much leeway the monetary authorities have on trying to improve
upon the inefficient flexible price allocation. The way this is accomplished is
via the cyclical manipulation of markups. However, in our setting, manipulat-
ing markups over the business cycle involves a tradeoff. On the one hand, the
management of markups could in theory reduce the volatility of consumption,
employment and/or bring about a more favorable covariance between these
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two variables. On the other hand, letting the markups vary carries a cost be-
cause it leaves the relative price distortion in place. One cannot tell a priori
how the costs and benefits of imperfect price stabilization vary with the degree
of price rigidity. The greater the degree of price rigidity the higher the cost
of imperfect price targeting, but at the same time, the greater the ability of
the monetary authorities to influence markups. The importance of our results
precisely lies in their providing information about the net effect of these two
opposing factors.
— Tables 2 and 3 about here —
Tables 2 and 3 report the main results for the cashless (ζ=1e-12) and monetary
economy (ζ=1) respectively. The tables contain results from a large number
of specifications and experiments and aim at conveying information about the
type of policy that fares best relative to the perfect inflation targeting rule
(and how well quantitatively) as a function of a vector of the main features
of the model, and information about the macroeconomic properties of these
policies (volatility of inflation and output). The tables are designed on the
following principles: First, that the two most important features explored in
the analysis are the role played by capital and the effect of risk aversion. Hence
the top half in each table reports results from the benchmark economy without
capital and the bottom half from the economy with capital accumulation. The
left half reports results with standard risk aversion (σ = 1.5) while the right
one with high risk aversion (σ = 3.5). Second, it takes into account the fact
that the perfect inflation targeting rule is the benchmark, so that all other
rules are to be compared to it in terms of the loss measure described above.
Third, the tables show the result of a specification –across policy rules– search
for the ”best” rule, that is the rule that produces the largest gain (smallest
loss) over the inflation targeting rule for each of the important model features
discussed above (the degree of price rigidity, capital adjustment costs and the
mark up). In addition and for completeness purposes, we report the results
for the general parametrization described in Table 1. Fourth, the tables also
report the volatility of output and inflation for the ”best” rule and the inflation
targeting rule. All this information is reported for each one of the three shocks
in the model (supply, A, fiscal, G, and monetary, M).
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As an illustration, consider the third cell in the first row in Table 2. It says
that as far as variation in the markup (θ) is concerned and in the face of supply
shocks, the rule that performs the best against the perfect inflation targeting
rule is monetary targeting (MT ). This obtains when the steady state mark
up is quite large (θ=0.7, that is, a markup of 43%). The associated relative
loss is 0.0044%. That is, the agents would be willing to give up 0.0044 of their
wealth in order to prevent a switch from a perfect inflation targeting rule to
the second best (among the 5 rules considered) monetary targeting one. We
can also see that this second best rule entails slightly less output volatility
than the perfect inflation targeting rule (a standard deviation of 1.98 vs 2.17)
but significantly more inflation volatility (0.41 vs 0).
The main pattern that emerges in the ”cashless” version of the model is that
none of the four rules described in section 1.4 does better than perfect in-
flation targeting. Only when investment is present and prices are flexible 14
the imperfect inflation targeting rule does better than perfect targeting rule
(under both supply and fiscal shocks). But in this case the welfare advantage
is completely negligible (less than 0.12e-08).
These findings are interesting because one might have thought that the param-
eters determining the strength of the distortions would have played a major
role for the welfare rankings of the monetary policies considered. In particular,
one may have presumed that the greater the inefficiency of the flexible price
economy (the lower the θ), the weaker the incentive to replicate the flexible
price equilibrium would have been. Similarly, one may have thought that price
stability would lose its appeal if the relative price distortion were small. Ap-
parently, our results suggest that, as prices become more flexible, the ability
to manipulate markups decreases faster than the cost of the relative price
distortion.
The results are similar in the version of the model that also allows for a
”non–negligible” monetary distortion (ζ = 1). Perfect inflation stabilization is
outperformed by other rules as long as the degree of price flexibility is quite
14 It must be noted that imperfect inflation outperforms perfect inflation targeting
in this case even with some small price rigidity (q > 0.75).
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high 15 . In this case, low risk aversion works in favor of those other rules. Or if
risk aversion is high, investment is also needed to be present for these rules to
perform better. One can thus claim that capital accumulation and a monetary
friction can undermine the case for perfect price stability for all types of shocks
and independent of the level of risk aversion and mark ups as long as prices
are quite (but not necessarily perfectly) flexible. Moreover, the degree of price
instability tolerated by these rules is non negligible.
But before proceeding to argue, based on the findings reported above, that
inflation targeting is a bad idea one must first consider the following caveat. It
should not be forgotten that the practical relevance of policy induced fluctua-
tions in the inflation rate is limited when prices are relatively flexible (unless
the monetary distortion is quantitatively very large, which seems rather un-
likely). This is due to the fact that, in this case, money does not matter
much for real economic activity and hence the welfare differences across dif-
ferent policy rules range from quite small to negligible. For instance, the gains
from following an imperfect rather than a perfect inflation targeting rule when
prices are slightly rigid (q = 0.75) tend to be smaller than 0.1e-08 of perma-
nent income. Consequently, our view is that one should not see the results as
significantly weakening the case for perfect price stability in the NNS model.
What is the explanation for these findings? We think that the reason that
both distortions as well as investment are needed in order for some inflation
variability to be desirable is related to the behavior of the gap between the
natural rate and the efficient equilibrium. This wedge is constant with the
monopolistic distortion but variable with the monetary friction. Nevertheless,
as the time variation in this wedge is quite limited due to the small role played
by real balances for economic activity in models such as hours, the deviation
from perfect price stability is not quantitatively significant even in the presence
of investment (as conjectured by Goodfriend and King (2001) and Woodford
(2003)).
15While these other rules do best against the perfect inflation rule when prices are
perfectly flexible, they still do better as long as price rigidity is limited. In particular,
these rules start doing better at around q = 0.75, that is with a quarterly frequency
of price adjustment.
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3.1 The Kim and Kim Critique
In an recent paper, Kim and Kim (2003) have demonstrated that using a first
order log–linear approximation to the decisions rules and a second order ap-
proximation to the utility function (a popular practice) can lead to erroneous
welfare computations (see also Woodford (2003), for a general discussion of
this issue). In order to gauge the relevance of the Kim & Kim critique for our
model we have solved the model and computed welfare using the following
alternative procedures: (a) log–quadratic approximation to both the decision
rules and to utility (QQ in the table), (b) log–linear approximation to the de-
cision rules and high order approximation to utility (L8 in the table) and (c)
log–linear approximation to the decision rules and quadratic approximation to
utility (LQ in the table). Recall that the results reported above are obtained
using a log–quadratic approximation to the decision rules and a high order
approximation to utility (Q8 in the table). Table 4 offers a comparison.
— Table 4 about here —
Two features stand out. First, procedure (a) above and our procedure lead to
identical results. Hence, a second order approximation to utility is sufficient
when the decision rules are approximated at the second order. And second,
the Kim & Kim critique does apply to a model such as ours. Thus it is indeed
the case that procedures (b) and (c) above may produce misleading welfare
comparisons of alternative policies. For instance, based on a log-linear approx-
imation to the decisions rules one would conclude that money targeting does
better than perfect inflation targeting in the case of supply shocks, while the
results from the second order approximation suggest exactly the opposite.
4 Concluding Remarks
The New Neoclassical Synthesis literature has presented a very strong case for
inflation stabilization. Nevertheless, the general applicability of this result has
remained unknown because of some restrictive features of the models that have
been used to analyze optimal monetary policy (for instance, the absence of
15
investment). The valued added of this paper can be found in its use of a more
general specification to address the issue of price stability. Our results confirm
Goodfriend and King (2001) conjecture that the case for inflation stabilization
may not be undermined by the inclusion of capital accumulation.
We have shown that this conjecture is valid independently of many key fea-
tures of the model (risk aversion, size of mark up, level of capital adjustment
costs) as long as prices are not very flexible. But when prices are very flex-
ible, monetary policy does not matter much and hence the issue of optimal
monetary policy is of little practical relevance. A possible explanation for the
maintained strength of the case for inflation stability is that our model ex-
hibits limited variation in the gap between the natural and the efficient level
of output. In particular, the monopolistic distortion induces a constant wedge
between these two quantities while the monetary friction’s influence on that
wedge is weak. It remains to be seen whether the case for inflation stability
will retain its validity in models with capital accumulation and other distor-
tions, if those distortions induce significant variation in the the gap between
the natural and the efficient level of output.
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Table 1
Calibration: Benchmark case
Technology
Capital elasticity of intermediate output α 0.2500
Capital adjustment costs parameter ϕ 10.0000
Depreciation rate δ 0.0250
Parameter of markup θ 0.8000
Probability of price resetting q 0.2500
Preferences
Discount factor β 0.9880
Relative risk aversion σ 1.5000
CES weight in utility function ν 0.3405
Money demand parameter ζ 1.0000
Parameter of transaction cost (linear) A 0.0111
Parameter of transaction cost (constant) B 0.0752
Shocks
Persistence of technology shock ρa 0.9500
Standard deviation of technology shock σa 0.0079
Persistence of government spending shock ρg 0.9696
Volatility of government spending shock σg 0.0098
Persistence of money demand shock ρζ 0.9500
Volatility of money demand shock σζ 0.0180
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on
ru
le
s,
8t
h
or
de
r
ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
of
th
e
ut
ili
ty
fu
nc
ti
on
;
L
8:
L
in
ea
r
de
ci
-
si
on
ru
le
s,
8t
h
or
de
r
ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
of
th
e
ut
ili
ty
fu
nc
ti
on
;
Q
Q
:
qu
ad
ra
ti
c
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s,
qu
ad
ra
ti
c
ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
of
th
e
ut
ili
ty
fu
nc
ti
on
;
L
Q
:
L
in
ea
r
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s,
qu
ad
ra
ti
c
ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
of
th
e
ut
ili
ty
fu
nc
ti
on
.
A
,
G
an
d
M
ar
e
th
e
su
pp
ly
,
fis
ca
l
an
d
m
on
ey
de
m
an
d
sh
oc
k
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
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